How Nod protects your servers
What is encrypted, with which key and where it lives; what Nod Cloud can and cannot see; and how to report a problem.
Last updated September 30, 2026
The Vault on your Mac
Your Hosts, Credentials, Snippets, History and Known Hosts live in a Vault: a file on your Mac, sealed with AES-256-GCM under a random key. That key is itself sealed by a key that never leaves your Mac's Secure Enclave and only works while you are logged in, so a copy of the file is useless on any other computer.
- Turn on Touch ID in Settings, and Nod asks for Touch ID or your Mac password when it opens, before it shows or copies a password, and when you unlock it.
- With Touch ID on, the Vault locks after 5 minutes without input, or at once with
⌘L. You can change the delay. - Private keys can stay in 1Password. Nod signs through the 1Password SSH agent, so the key is never copied into Nod at all.
- Nothing is sent anywhere unless you turn on sync for a Vault.
Connecting to servers
The Mac app connects straight from your Mac to your servers. Nod Cloud is not in the path. SSH and SFTP are handled by libssh, a widely used open-source library; Nod does not implement its own cryptography.
- The first time you connect to a server, Nod shows its host key fingerprint and asks you to check it before trusting it.
- If a server's key changes later, Nod stops with a warning that someone could be intercepting the connection. Cancel is the default, and there is no setting that skips the check.
- Trusted keys are kept in the Vault as Known Hosts, so they sync with the Vault and follow you to your other Devices.
Sync, with keys Nod Cloud holds
Sync is off until you turn it on, and then only for the Vaults you choose. Nod Cloud keeps the master copy of each Synced Vault and its keys, so every Mac or browser you sign in on gets all of them, with no other device online, and losing a device loses nothing.
- Changes travel over TLS and are stored encrypted with the Vault's key. Nod Cloud stores that key sealed with a server secret, kept apart from the database.
- Because Nod Cloud holds the keys, it can read what is in your Synced Vaults, and so could anyone who obtained both the database and that secret, or a court order for them. Sync is not end-to-end encrypted. Keep a Vault local if that matters for it.
- Removing a Device on the web signs it out of Nod Cloud: it gets nothing new. It keeps what it had already synced.
- When two Devices change the same password or key at the same time, Nod keeps both and asks you which one stays. A secret is never overwritten silently.
What Nod Cloud stores
| About | What it can see |
|---|---|
| Your Nod Account | Your name, email address and how you sign in. |
| Your Devices | Each Mac or browser's name, its public key, and when it was last seen. |
| Your Synced Vaults | A random ID, its keys (sealed with a server secret), and the size and time of each change. |
| What is inside your Synced Vaults | It can read them: Hosts, addresses, usernames, passwords, private keys, passphrases, Snippets and Known Hosts, because it holds the keys. Vaults you don't sync never leave your Mac. |
If you lose every Device, sign in on a new one and your Synced Vaults come back. A Vault you never synced exists only on your Mac, so keep an export of it.
Nod in the browser
In the browser, SSH and SFTP run inside the page. Nod Cloud's gateway only passes the encrypted connection between your browser and your server. It never holds the session's keys, so it cannot read your session or type into it.
- Clearing the site's data makes that browser a new Device, which gets your Synced Vaults again when you sign in.
- The gateway only connects to public addresses, on port 22 or on ports from 1024 up. It will not reach into a private network.
- It counts how long each connection is open and how many bytes pass, for your monthly minutes. It cannot see commands.
The on-device AI
The AI is a model that runs on your Mac, in a separate process that has no network access. You download it from Hugging Face only if you choose to, and Nod checks every file against a published checksum. Nothing you ask it goes to Nod Cloud or to anyone else.
- Before the model reads anything, every secret in your Vault, and anything that looks like a private key, a token or a password, is replaced with a label such as
[secret: credential "prod-db"]. Your terminal still shows the original. - Commands it runs are typed into your terminal, where you can see them. Read-only commands run by themselves; anything that changes a server waits for your approval, unless you turn on Autopilot for that conversation.
- Destructive commands, such as
rm -r,DROP TABLEorterraform destroy, always wait for you, even with Autopilot on.Escstops it at any time. - It only types at an empty shell prompt: never into a password prompt, a full-screen program, or a line you are writing.
- Conversations are kept in memory and never synced. A local, encrypted log records each command it ran and who approved it, for 90 days, without your questions or its answers.
Builds and updates
All of Nod is open source: the apps under Apache-2.0 and the server under AGPL-3.0. Every release is built from the public repository, and you can build the same app yourself.
- The project has no Apple Developer account yet, so the Mac app is signed locally and is not notarized by Apple. It also runs without the hardened runtime, which Apple ties to notarization. The download page explains the first launch.
- Nod does not update itself, so no new code reaches your Mac unless you install it.
- Nod Cloud's address is built into each release. An official build only talks to Nod Cloud, so nobody can talk you into pointing it at a server of theirs.
- The Mac app sends no telemetry, no analytics and no crash reports.
Reporting a vulnerability
If you find a security problem in the Mac app, the web app, Nod Cloud or this site, please report it privately through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting. Please do not open a public issue.
Include the version or the address you tested, the steps to reproduce it, and what an attacker could do with it. Please give the project time to release a fix before you publish anything. The same contact is published in security.txt.